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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Field, i.e., public lands at the time of admission of a state into the
Union, it seems that the jurisdiction of the state is complete unless
Congress makes reservation of jurisdiction as a condition of admis-
sion.2 9 A state, once admitted, is on the same basis as the other
states.
It may be noted that North Carolina has given in advance consent
to the acquisition by the federal government of land within the state
in accordance with the constitutional method. 0 Hence, federal juris-
diction over land purchased for purposes specified in the Constitu-
tion will be exclusive. It seems that places rented for these same
purposes, however, are of the concurrent jurisdiction type. As to
federal forest reserves, the North Carolina legislature authorizes the
federal government to acquire such lands but does not cede jurisdic-
tion over the lands.3 1 Likewise the proposed Smoky Mountain Na-
tional Park will be subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of the
United States and the State of North Carolina.;
2
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RECORDATION OF CHATTEL MORTGAGE AS NOTICE TO PURCHASER OF
AUTOMOBILE FROM STOCK IN TRADE
By statute in North Carolina' and other states, registration of
chattel mortgages is notice to all the world of the mortgagee's interest
in the chattel. No notice, however full and formal, is a sufficient
substitute for registration.2 The North Carolina statute does not
make any exception in regard to the recordation of chattel mortgages
on stock in trade exposed for sale. As a result of this omission, is
recordation of chattel mortgages on stock in trade notice to other-
wise bona fide purchasers for value of the mortgagee's interest in the
article purchased? Very few courts have passed on this question.3
I Ft. Leavenworth v. Lowe, supra note 2; U. S. v. Tully, 140 F. 899 (C. Ct.
Mont., 1905), unless legally set aside for military purposes, no exclusive juris-
diction vests; mere occupancy by army not sufficient.
C. S., §§808, 8059.
',"This consent is given upon condition that the state shall retain con-
current jurisdiction with the United States . . . so far as civil process in all
cases, and such criminal process as may issue under the authority of the state
... may be executed . . ." C. S., §8057. These reservations seem to be
placed in the statute out of abundance of caution.
' Pub. Laws, 1927, ch. 48.
'N. C. Cons. Stat. 3311, 3312.
2 Blalock v. Strain, 122 N. C. 283, 29 S. E. 408 (1895).
'If the mortgagor is left in possession, the mortgagee generally makes some
provision as to the mortgagor selling the stock in trade and applying part of
the proceeds on the mortgage debt. Hence the paucity of cases as to the par-
ticular point in question.
NOTES
In Rogers v. Booker,4 the court held that in the situation there in-
volved the purchaser for value took subject to the recorded mortgage.
In its opinion the court said: "This was not the case of a mortgage
upon a stock of goods left in the hands of the mortgagor for sale,"
thus intimating that a different result would have been reached if it
were a mortgage upon stock in trade.5
The recent North Carolina case of Whitehurst v. GarrettO squarely
involves this situation. The plaintiff, the holder of a mortgage of
five automobiles specifically described and properly recorded, was
allowed to recover from the defendant in a civil action of claim and
delivery one new Pontiac automobile bought by the defendant from
the dealer mortgagor. At the time of the purchase by the defendant
this car was kept with others in a display window for sale to anyone
who cared to purchase. The justice writing the opinion said:
"There is no sufficient evidence to show an implied agency giving
the mortgagor a right to sell free from the mortgage lien." Assum-
ing there was no agency,7 it is submitted there was sufficient evidence
to warrant an estoppel by conduct as to a bona fide purchaser for
value. Where a mortgagee leaves goods with the mortgagor whose
business it is to sell such goods, and permits the goods to be exposed
for sale by the mortgagor, he is estopped to deny the right of a bona
fide purchaser for value. 8 There was no intention in the instant
' 184 N. C. 183, 186, 113 S. E. 672 (1922). The mortgagor here was not a
dealer in automobiles. He operated a storage room for cars. There was evi-
dence that he had never sold a car.
'There are three distinct theories as to mortgages on shifting stock in
trade where the mortgagor is allowed to remain in possession and sell as if
there were no mortgage. First: Such mortgages are void and fraudulent as
to creditors and purchasers for value without n6tice. Gray v. Atlantic Trust
and Deposit Co., 113 Va. 580, 75 S. E. 226 (1912) ; Reynolds v. Ellis, 103 N. Y.
115, 8 N. E. 392, 57 Am. Rep. 701 (1886) ; Standard Brewery Co. v. Nudelman,
70 Ill. App. 356, affirmed in 172 Ill. 337, 50 N. E. 190 (1898), held such a
-mortgage to be void even as to a purchaser of the entire stock. Second: Such
mortgages are presumptively fraudulent and void. New v. Sailors, 114 Ind.
407, 16 N. E. 609, 5 Am. St. Rep. 632 (1888). Cf. Blanton. Grocery Co. v.
Taylor, 162 N. C. 307, 78 S. E. 276 (1913). Third: Such mortgages are valid in
the absence of actual fraud, fraud being a question for the jury under the
facts of each particular case. Williams v. Wilson, 12 R. I. 9, 12 (1877).
196 N. C. 154, 144 S. E. 835 (1928).
This seems technically correct. There was no showing of a prior course of
dealing between the mortgagor and mortagee that would warrant the court
in holding that the mortgagor had implied power to sell. Nor is there any
express or apparent authority to sell. The mortgagor is held out as owner,
not as agent. If there was an agency relation the result would be obvious.
'Dissenting opinion in Hardin v. State Bank of Seattle, 119 Wash. 169, 205
Pac. 382 (1922) : "Where one of two equally innocent persons must suffer, he
should bear the burden whose conduct has induced the loss." Pickering v.
Bust, 15 East, 45, 104 English Reports, 761 (1812). More specifically see notes
10, 11, and 12, infra.
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case that the mortgagor should cease business. The loan was made
in order that the mortgagor might continue the purchase and sale of
automobiles. Even the mortgagee's testimony showed that he per-
mited the mortgaged automobiles to be exposed for sale:
"I knew that he (mortgagor) was an automobile dealer and had
a show and display room on the corner of Main and Road Street ...
I knew that the cars that were kept in that show room were kept
there for the purpose of indiscriminate sale to anyone who wanted to
buy. . . . I never made any effort to take them from his (mort-
gagor's) show room. . . . I live within one block of the show room
and pass it several times a day when I am in town!'
The plaintiff vested the mortgagor with- all the indicia of owner-
ship and permitted him to hold himself out to the world as owner.
Such conduct should estop the mortgagee from asserting his claim
as against the defendant purchaser. The Virginia and Arizona10
courts on an almost similar set of facts, and the Texas"' court by
interpretation of statute, have held that the mortgagee was estopped by
his conduct from asserting his ownership against a purchaser for
value and without actual notice.
By the decision in Whitehurst v. Garrett the North Carolina court
has preserved the integrity of the recording acts, as it evidently set
out to do,1 2 and as a literal interpretation of the statute warrants, but
it has failed to take into consideration actual business experience,
expediency and practice. No purchaser of a new automobile from a
dealer goes to the county seat to determine if that particular car is
mortgaged. To follow the decision of this case to its logical result
would indeed be unfortunate for free business intercourse. Every
purchaser of a horse from a livery stable; every purchaser of farming
implements, of household furniture, of a piano, or a typewriter, or
of any article of a stock of drugs or groceries that could be specific-
ally described would be required to search the registry for any incum-
Rudolph v. Farmers Supply Co., 131 Va. 305, 313, 108 S. E. 638, 640
(1921), citing with approval Boice v. Finance and Guaranty Corp., 127 Va.
563, 102 S. E. 591, 10 A. L. R. 654 (1920). This case and the ones in the
two note infra present situations almost identical with that in Whitehurst v.
Garrett, supra note 6.
'Kearby v. Western States Securities Co., 250 Pac. 760 (Ariz., 1926).
Recordation of conditional sales.
'First Nat. Bank of Stephenville v. Thompson, 265 S. W. 884 (Texas,
1924), construing Revised Civil Statutes, Article 3970. For the text of the
statute see infra note 16.
"Whatever may be the holding elsewhere, the registration of mortgages
is favored in this jurisdiction." Supra note 6.
NOTES
brance in order to protect himself from the mortgagee's claim. It
may be argued that this is a matter of degree and that the holding
would not apply to small and inexpensive articles. This argument is
unsound, for the recordation act is silent as to any degree of size or
value of the article mortgaged just as it is silent as to any exception
in case of stock in trade. If a person lending money on an auto-
mobile in stock is to be protected by his recorded mortgage, why
should not the mortgagee of a piano, chair, or typewriter in the hands
of a dealer and exposed for sale be protected, provided the mort-
gaged article is specifically described so that it may be identified?
In his transactions with an automobile dealer how will the purchaser
determine at what point along the scale the registry act applies as
to the sale of articles ranging from a small wrench to a Rolls-Royce?
The distinction as to degree is not a valid one. It is true that the
mortgage in the instant case is on particular articles in a stock in
trade rather than on the entire stock as such. A California case's
makes a distinction between the two, but the distinction seems un-
warranted provided the goods in each instance are adequately de-
scribed and properly recorded. The result as to the purchaser is the
same regardless of whether the mortgage is on the entire stock in
which his car is included, or only on his particular car. If he searched
the registry in either case he would be put on notice as to the mort-
gagee's claim. However necessary the result in Whitehurst v. Garrett
may be as a matter of statutory interpretation, from an economical
point of view an escape from the holding. seems not only desirable,
14
but absolutely imperative. Practically every purchaser of an auto-
mobile in North Carolina today is subjecting himself to double pay-
ment, or at least to payment and then the risk of having the car sold
to pay the remaining mortgage indebtedness; for most concerns fi-
nancing automobile dealers take some security similar to a chattel
mortgage on the cars. If the court (since its duty, broadly speaking,
is to interpret, not to make the laws) feels that the integrity of the
"Hardin v. State Bank of Seattle, 119 Wash. 169, 205 Pac. 382 (1922)."4How could the corporation financing the automobile dealer protect itself
under a decision contra to Whitehurst v. Garrett? It could not resort to the
conditional sale, for North Carolina has repeatedly held that when used as a
method of security it was no more than a chattel mortgage. The Texas court
has held the same way as regards a trust receipt. General Motors Acceptance
Corp. v. Baddeker, 274 S. W. 1016 (Tex., 1925). What the finance corpor-
ation really does is to charge 2. slightly higher rate, anticipating these bcca-
sional losses, and thus protect itself in advance. Possibly some guaranty or
indemnity company would insure the hanker or the one furnishing the credit
against possible default of the dealer.
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recordation acts forbids its making an exception in case of stock in
trade, such an exception should be immediately incorporated by the
legislature in the recordation acts of North Carolina. The following
provision of the Uniform Chattel Mortgage Act15 is offered as a
suggestion:
"If the mortgagee allows the goods to be placed in the mortgagor's
stock in trade-or sales or exhibition room, this shall have like effect
as written consent to sell, in favor of any purchaser in the ordinary
course of the mortgagor's business, not, however, including a pur-
chaser by way of mortgage, pledge or sale in bulk or in payment of
antecedent debts."
J. W. CREW, JR.
EFFECT OF PAYMENT UPON OPERATION OF STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
AGAINST A RUNNING ACCOUNT FOR SERVICES
In solving a problem involving a given account it is important as
a conceptual matter first to ascertain the general rules governing
accounts in order to understand the nature, and make the proper
classification, of the account in question.
1-Ditinction between mutual and running accounts.
As usually defined a mutual account is one based upon a course
of dealing wherein each party has given credit to the other upon the
faith of his indebtedness to the other.' It is essential to a mutual
1§18, par. 2 (a). Texas Revised Civil Statutes, Article 3970, is somewhat
similar to the provision of the Uniform Chattel Mortgage Act:
"Every mortgage, deed of trust, or other form of lien attempted to be
given by the owner of any stock of goods, wares, or merchandise, daily exposed
to sale, in parcels, in the regular course of the business of such merchandise,
and contemplating a continuance of the -possession of said goods and control
of said business, by sale of said goods by said owner, shall be deemed fraudu-
lent and void." Wagons, buggies, automobiles, and the like have been treated
as stock of goods, wares, or merchandise under this statute. Supra note 12.
The Uniform Chattel Mortgage Act has not been adopted in any of the
states.
'Bank of Blakely v. Buchannan, 83 Ga. App. 793, 80 S. E. 42 (1913). The
following definitions of running accounts appear in the later North Carolina
reports: "A running and mutual account within the meaning of these issues (as
to whether an action upon account was barred by the statute) is one growing
,out of reciprocal dealings between the parties in which each extends credit to
the other and with the understanding, express or implied, that, on adjustment
had, the items supplied and charged shall be allowed as proper credits." Hol-
lingsworth v. Allen, 176 N. C. 629, 97 S. E. 625 (1918). "The account must be
!mutual-that is, involving reciprocal rights and liabilities; open-that is, con-
template further dealings between the parties; and current-that is, running with
-no time limitation fixed by agreement, express or implied, with the balance to
be determined by an adjustment of credit and debit items." McKinnie Bros.
Co. v. Wester, 188 N. C. 514, 516, 125 S. E. 1 (1924).
